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645 
UNITED STATES/EUROPEAN UNION TRADE 
RELATIONS: THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION TO 
THE BOVINE TRADE DISPUTES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Maintaining stable social and political relations among trading countries 
presents the global community with an ever increasing challenge. In response 
to this challenge, nations, both individually and through alliances, have 
established a system of laws to govern trade disputes.1 Currently, scholarship 
on “international economic law” reflects the attitude of business and 
government toward trade issues.2 The standards and expectations of 
alliances, governments and businesses form the basis of the law and, along 
with arbitration, are useful in dispute resolution without resorting to the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),3 under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), for assistance.4 
Beyond the economic aspects, social, political and technological factors play 
influential roles in disputes and dispute settlements. The purpose of this Note 
is to demonstrate, using bovine trade issues, how all of these factors impact 
trade disputes and resolutions. 
This Note examines the use of the WTO to resolve disputes between the 
United States and European Union. Part II addresses trade in the United 
States (“U.S.”) and European Union (“EU”) in the context of the 
governments’ relations. Part III of this Note is devoted to the history of 
bovine somatotropin encepalopathy (“BSE”), commonly known as “mad 
cow disease.” Part IV focuses on an example of the EU bovine legislation’s 
impact on the U.S. 
This Note discusses the reasons for the trade disputes, including the 
U.S.’s and EU’s positions. Possible explanations for the European Union 
 
 
 1. This system of laws includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 51 
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter “GATT”]. 
 2. See Joel P. Trachtman, Introduction: The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 33 (1996); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, “International Economic Law”: 
Implications for Scholarship , 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 505, 505 (1996). 
 3. The Uruguay Round of GATT established the World Trade Organization (WTO). See Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1143, 1144 
(1994). 
 4. See, e.g., Nafta  Arbitral Panel: Final Report of the Panel in the Matter of Tariffs Applied by 
Canada to Certain U.S. Origin Agricultural Products, Arbitral Panel Report, available in 1997 BDIEL 
AD LEXIS 24. 
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legislation, including protectionism, cultural expectations, health and safety 
concerns and socio-economic power issues are addressed.  
Finally, a model for future trade relations, a Trans-Atlantic Agreement, is 
proposed. This Note does not purport to solve the trade dispute problem. 
Rather, the purpose herein is to outline the many factors requiring 
consideration for any solution to the U.S. and EU trade disputes. 
II. THE ROLE OF TRADE IN THE U.S./EU RELATIONSHIP 
While other economies have been affected recently by the diminishing 
values of their markets,5 the U.S. and the EU remain strong economic 
powers. U.S. exports compose a large percentage of the EU imports,6 and the 
EU supplies nearly one third of all imports into the U.S.7 Clearly, the 
relationship between the countries remains very important both for the U.S. 
economy and for the continued growth and success of the EU.8 Still disputes 
often arise between friendly governments, however, under the veil of self-
preservation.9 Yet, the preservation of open trade between the U.S. and EU is 
as important today as ever, especially because the fragile economic 
framework of the U.S. and EU depends upon the improvement of the 
relationship.10 
Trade disputes between the EU and the U.S. have arisen during the last 
ten years over products such as bananas11 and beef.12 When settled, these 
 
 
 5. Japan and Russia have seen substantial economic changes in their markets during 1998. See 
Heading for a Meltdown?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 13 (addressing the problems in the Russian 
and Asian economies and examining the effects on the United States markets); Russia Takes the 
Plunge, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1998, at 14 (exploring the attempt to “cajole” Russians into a security 
program in the wake of their economic despair after the collapse of the Russian economic market); 
Asia’s Coming Explosion, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1998, at 15 (examining the political breakdown in 
Asia following the economic crisis). 
 6. See Trade Relations with Europe and the New Trans-Atlantic Economic Partnership: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Trade of the House Comm. on ways and means, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(statement of Honorable Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative) at 1. [hereinafter “Trade 
Hearings”] “America’s trade and investment relationship with the European Union is the largest in the 
world.” Id. 
 7. See Trade Hearings, supra  note 6, at 2. Representative Barshefsky stated that the United 
States and European Union’s investment in each other’s countries in 1997 exceeded $750 billion, 
“almost perfectly balanced.” Id. 
 8. See Trade Hearings, supra  note 6. 
 9. See Trade Hearings, supra note 6. 
 10. See World Trade Organization, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones): Report of the Appellate Body (Jan. 16, 1999) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/distab_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Appellate Decision]; Through the Trans-Atlantic Economic 
Partnership, the United States and European Union will be able to “address” some of their trade 
problems.  
 11. See World Trade Organization: Report of the Appellate Body on the European Communities 
Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, 37 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 243 
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disputes have usually been resolved by negotiation between the two countries 
or by an arbitration panel. More recently, disputes have been submitted to the 
WTO for a determination of compliance with GATT.13 When the WTO 
determines that the measures, sanctions, or legislation of a particular country 
violate GATT, that country is expected to follow the guidelines of the treaty 
or the mandate of the WTO.14 In the EU specifically, trade has been difficult 
as the international community has sought to overcome “internal obstacles” 
to accessing the European market.15 One example of an internal obstacle to 
the European Market is the European reaction to technological 
developments, especially in the area of food products.16 The EU has been 
 
 
(1998). The European Union was found to be in violation of the GATT in attempting to enforce 
hurricane licenses for the importation of bananas. The term “banana wars” is used to refer to the 
European Union’s continued defiance of the WTO decision on the banana t rade dispute. The United 
States recently retaliated against the European Union’s actions by imposing double tariffs on certain 
products such as cheeses from France and olive oil from Italy, in accordance with the rights granted by 
the WTO for failure of a member state to comply with its dispute settlement body decisions. This 
authorized retaliation may have significant impact on the targeted industries. (CITE: Newsweek, etc.) 
 The E.U.’s citizens also opposed the introduction of genetically engineered corn and have 
attempted to keep the product out of their market. See 105 CONG. REC. S1481 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1997) 
(statement on introduced bills and joint resolution). 
 12. See World Trade Organization, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones); Complaint by the United States; Report of the Panel (Aug. 18, 1997) 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_dispu_e/distab_e.htm [hereinafter “WTO Decision”]. The bovine 
disputes include the BST Controversy relating to products from hormone-injected cows and, re 
recently, pharmaceutical and cosmetic products containing certain bovine products due to an alleged 
BSE threat. 
 13. See id. The tariff dispute in this case is an example of the type of dispute the World Trade 
Organization was established to settle.  
 14. The findings of the WTO are only as enforceable as the international community permits. 
The GATT is a binding treaty with which the European Union is expected to comply, yet there are no 
evident sanctions for failure to comply with the mandates of the WTO. In the present dispute, the 
decision of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the Appellate Report were interpreted by an 
arbitrator, giving the European Union an additional fifteen months from the date of the Arbitrator’s 
report to comply with the decisions. The countries did not see the effect of the decision until July of 
1999. See World Trade Organization, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones): 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (May 29, 1998), at 21. <http://www.wto.org/ddf/cgi-
bin/dispdoc.pl?url=/ddf/cgi-bin/vdkw_cgi@8001/>[hereinafter “WTO Arbitration Report”]; see also 
Stephen J. Rothberg, From Beer to BST: Circumventing the GATT Standards Code’s Prohibition on 
Unnecessary Obstacles to Trade, 75 MINN. L. REV. 505, 515 (1990). 
 15. See World Trade Organization, WTO Implementation and Single Market Completion Lead to 
Greater Liberalization in the European Union (Nov. 12, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/ddf/cgi-
bin/dispdoc.pl?url=/ddf/cgi-bin/vdkw_cgi@8001/xab30c5ae-93…/>. 
 16. The European Union has a tradition of objecting to technological developments reflected in 
food products. See discussion of “Banana Wars”, supra note 11; see also , Kirsten S. Beaudoin, On 
Tonight’s Menu: Toasted Cornbread with Firefly Genes? Adapting Food Labeling Law to Consumer 
Protection Needs in the Biotech Century, 83 MARQ . L. REV. 237, 242 (1999) (reviewing the Food and 
Drug Administration’s challenges in the United States for labeling food products, addressing the risks 
of genetically modified foods in areas from economics to health and safety standards, and confirming 
the apathy of the FDA in dealing with populace concerns with potentially harmful effects of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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developing trade policies and regulations to make trade more accessible.17 
The EU must take further steps, however, to alleviate the tension surrounding 
trade, including liberalizing their trade legislation.12 
A. International Economic Law 
International law has evolved to address economic issues relating to trade 
and tariff restrictions.18 The GATT, a complex multilateral agreement signed 
in 1947,19 is illustrative of twentieth century attempts to establish and enforce 
a system of rules to help in dispute settlement, with the ultimate purpose of 
avoiding an international armed conflict.20 
Today, the area of international law that deals with business transactions 
is called “international economic law.”21 This term encompasses economic, 
business, and trade issues in the legal community.22 The rules and institutions 
that affect international economic activity include the WTO, NAFTA,23 and 
other institutions.24 Scholars of international economic law suggest this area 
of the law is very broad and includes many disciplines, affecting law in its 
development, application and enforcement.25 The example of beef trade 
between the United States and European Union is representative of their 
commercial relations and illustrates the breadth of complexity of this 
emerging system of law. 
 
 
genetically modified foods.  
 17. See Beaudoin, supra note 16. 
 18. The traditional role of international law has been to address laws of war and peace and other 
areas of public law. International economic law impacts the private sector, affecting industries as well 
as governments and economies.  
 19. See supra  note 1. 
 20. For an examination of the treaty state of the international community after the second World 
War, see George K. Walker Anticipatory Collective Self Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties 
have Said , 31 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 321.  
 21. See Trachtman, supra, note 2 (evaluating the definitions of private and public international 
law and their application to business goals, and proposing future goals for the area of international 
economic law). 
 22. See id.  
 23. North American Free Trade Agreement. 
 24. See Abbott, supra  note 2. There are three identified developments in the “economic” aspect 
of international economic law. The first is the increased demand for consistency in national regulatory 
programs for trade and investment (“level playing field”). Id. at 508. The second area of development 
is the convergence of environmental and economic concepts in policy making (sustainable 
development). See id . at 509. The third area is the “linking of economic and social policy.” Id. The 
final area is already an integral part of the European Union. See id .  
 25. See Abbott, supra  note 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/12
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B. Bovine Somatotropin Trade Dispute 
One bovine trade dispute between the U.S. and the EU has been over U.S. 
bovine products (milk and beef) containing the genetically engineered 
hormone bovine somatotropin (BST).26 Since 1987, the U.S. has been 
fighting to reopen the doors of the EU to U.S. beef.27 In 1988, the European 
Council enacted a directive28 that banned certain bovine food products, 
including those containing BST.29 This directive has been modified several 
 
 
 26. For the purposes of this Note, rBST (recombinant bovine somatotropin) and BST (bovine 
somatotropin) are the same thing, but to preserve the language of certain texts, the rBST reference may 
be used in footnotes, while BST is used in the text. Not only does this dispute over U.S. bovine 
products with BST concern the beef that entered the European Market, but the dispute also concerns 
the use of hormones in dairy products. See Terence P. Stewart, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade 
Organization and the International Trade of Dairy Products, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 55 (1999). 
 27. See WTO Decision, supra  note 12, at 13. “In March 1987, the United States raised the issue 
of the EC ban under the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT 
Agreement”).” Id. The United States advanced “retaliatory” measures on imports from European 
Union member states in 1989. These measures were not lifted until 1996 when a panel was established 
to examine the “rights and obligations of Parties deriving from Article 14.25 [of the TBT 
Agreement].” Id. (citing to GATT document TBT/M/Spec/7, p.9, para. 34). 
 28. The European Council of Ministers enacts directives only in urgent matters. See Emil Noel, 
Working Together. The Institutions of the European Community Office for the Publications of the 
European Community, in  T HE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 23 (J.D. Dinnage & 
J.F. Murphy, eds., 1996). The European Union’s legislation is developed by three bodies given power 
under Article 189 of the EC Treaty. See id. The European Commission is responsible for initiating 
action by proposing legislation. See id. at 28. The European Council of Ministers, composed of 
government heads, then reviews the proposals and chooses to pass the legislation by a majority, turn 
down the proposal, or amend the proposal by unanimous consent. See id. The European Parliament, 
composed of elected figures from each member state, then reviews the legislation and can submit its 
evaluations to the Council. See id. at 27. The Parliamentary function is not binding, though it remains 
politically influential. See id. at 28. 
 There are three different types of legislation in addition to the three different bodies that  
participate in legislative development. See Article 189, Maastricht Treaty, Feb. 7, 1992, which states: 
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the European 
Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall make 
regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make reservations or deliver opinions. (1) A 
regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable 
in all Member States. (2) A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form 
and methods. (3) A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. 
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.” 
For an official interpretation of Article 189, in part, see Confederation Nationale des Producteurs de 
Fruits a Legumes v. Council, (1962) ECR 471, (1963) CMLR 160, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, 115 (J.D. Dinnage & J.F. Murphy, eds., 1996) (A regulation is of general 
scope and is directly applicable in all member states, whereas a decision is obligatory only for 
designated persons.); Van Duyn v. Home Office, (1974) ECR 1337, (1975) 1 CMLR 1, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 19 (J.D. Dinnage & J.F. Murphy, eds., 1996) 
(Directives may reflect a comprehensive policy in a specific area of law and cannot be invoked before 
the time limit for state implementation has expired.) 
 29. EC Council Directive 88/146/EEC, cited in WTO Decision, supra  note 12, at 11. Adopted by 
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times,30 but states that no food products with genetically engineered hormone 
stimulants will be allowed into the EU. The European Community stated that 
the health and safety of its citizens was the purpose for the regulation.31 The 
result, however, is that the enforcement of the directive banned a majority of 
U.S. beef products.32 Despite the ban, the use of BST in the U.S. has 
increased since 1989.33 
BST is a naturally occurring hormone that stimulates the production of 
milk in cows.34 Early in the 1980’s, researchers35 found that, if injected with 
the genetically engineered synthetic growth hormone cows could begin 
producing milk younger and could produce more milk in a shorter period of 
time.36 Introduction of BST into the U.S. market spurred a great deal of 
controversy.37 Initially, BST was tested in various markets prior to FDA 
approval and complete investigation.38 The conflict within the U.S. continued 
 
 
the EC Council on March 16, 1988, this directive combined previously annulled Directive 
85/649/EEC, which banned the use of substances, with a 1984 proposal to control three natural growth 
hormones. See id. 
 30. See id .  
 31. See WTO Decision, supra note 12 (providing an examination of the European Communities’ 
argument before the WTO); Edmund L. Andrews, In Victory for U.S., Europe Ban on Treated Beef is 
Ruled Illegal, NY T IMES, May 9, 1997 at A1 (purpose of the restriction in the European Union was to 
relieve the concern of European consumers over chemicals in food). 
 32. See WTO Decision, supra  note 12, at 18. In 1988, the European Council measure reduced the 
annual export of beef and veal to the European Union by $100 million. After 1989, when the measure 
took effect, the exports were reduced to virtually nothing. See id. 
 33. BST use in the United States increased after the FDA approved its use in 1994, and has 
become more widespread due to its cost effectiveness. See David Aboulafia, Pushing RBST: How the 
Law and the Political Process Were Used to Sell Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin to America, 15 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 603 (1998). However, the use of BST in the larger milk producing dairies has 
caused smaller dairies to go under and has made it more difficult for others to continue to thrive. See 
infra  note 38. As smaller Vermont dairies have closed, the use of BST has become a method of 
survival in the dairy industry. 
 34. See Kristine Cerro, High Tech Cows: The BST Controversy, 6 SAN JOUQUIN AGRI. L. REV. 
163 (1996). 
 35. Monsanto Company is the only company with patent on BST in the United States. See 
International Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996); Upjohn Co. v. Monsanto Co., 
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14917, at 1 (1992) (The Monsanto Company applied for a patent in 1987 for 
its product called Posilac; the “’713 patent” was issued to Monsanto on May 1, 1991, and was 
described as “a method of delivering prolonged release formulations of bovine somatotropin into the 
circulatory system of an animal.”). 
 36. See Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178 (1995); Upjohn Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14917; See also Cerro, supra note 34. 
 37. See Aboulafia, supra  note 33, at 607. Aboulafia describes in detail the U. S. reaction to the 
introduction of BST into the consumer food market. See id. at 621-26. 
 38. See id. at 606; Emily Marden Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone and the Courts: In 
Search of Justice, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 617, 619 (1998). The introduction of BST affected the milk 
industry, driving many smaller milk producers out of business, as they became unable to compete with 
these new, larger, more efficient producers. See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n 92 F.3d 67, 78 (Leval, J., 
dissenting).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/12
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as at least one state attempted to subtly override the federal approval of BST 
in the dairy industry.39 Concern among U.S. consumers grew after FDA 
approval, when consumers questioned the validity of the measures and 
decision of the FDA.40 Both consumers and small dairy farmers resented the 
swift approval of BST, which they believed to be premature.41 
As conflict grew among the states, the EU decided, without explanation, 
to reject the importation of hormone treated beef into its market.42 This action 
was analogous to the FDA’s usual policy prior to approval of a drug.43 
However, the European Commission had no intention of ever approving BST 
food products, maintaining instead that health and safety concerns justified 
the ban.44 The concern was that the treated animals would be more likely to 
 
 
 39. See, e.g. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n 92 F.3d 67. In this case, the plaintiffs challenged on First 
Amendment grounds a Vermont statute requiring labeling of dairy products to indicate whether or not 
the cows had been injected with rBST. The Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs met their burden of 
demonstrating irreparable harm and had a chance of winning on the merits of the case. See id. at 74. 
The court further noted that Vermont could not reasonably have claimed an interest in protecting 
public health because the extensive studies and conclusions of the FDA showed that no public health 
threat existed. See id. at 73. The court held that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state 
interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate factual statement,” and suggested further that the 
Vermont statute was probably unconstitutional because no evidence of real harm existed. Id. at 74. The 
court remanded the case to the district court for entry of a proper injunction. See id.  
 40. See Stauber v. Shalala , 895 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Wis. 1995). In Stauber, the plaintiffs, 
American consumers of dairy products, challenged the FDA approval of Monsanto’s patent application 
for a drug called Posilac, a synthetic bovine growth hormone drug. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
approval was arbitrary and capricious because the FDA failed to properly assess the health and safety 
risks of the drug, failed to place a mandatory labeling requirement upon manufacturers, and failed to 
adequately assess the environmental effects of Posilac’s approval. See id. at 1182. The court found that 
the FDA approved Posilac on November 5, 1993 despite public criticism and despite concerns of 
possible “negative health effects on human consumers.” Id. at 1183. The court noted, however, that a 
Congressional task force found the FDA position adequately supported. The court accepted the task 
force’s finding and concluded that the amount rBST ingested by humans “poses no significant risk to 
human safety” due to the pasteurizing of milk and cooking of meat that would kill 90% of the rBST, 
and that the hormone is “orally inactive.” Id. at 1184. The court held that the FDA’s approval did not 
lack an adequate basis in the records, and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See 
id. at 1196-97. 
 Some consumers, as well as scientists and environmentalists, were infuriated by the lack of FDA 
protection. See Marden, supra  note 38, at 623. Such critics claim that FDA review of the bovine 
growth hormone was flawed and that particular health concerns were not addressed. See id.  
 41. See Stauber, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1192. 
 42. See David A. Wirth, European Communities Restrictions on Imports of Beef treated with 
Hormones—Nontariff Trade Barriers—Control of Food Additives—Scientific Basis for Restrictions—
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanisms— Scope of Review, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 755, 755 (1998). 
 43. See WTO Decision, supra  note 12. The European Union Regulation 88/146/EEC, published 
in 1988, bans all BST products. The FDA, prior to approval of products, will normally not allow the 
product to enter the stream of commerce. 
 44. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6. Hearing testimony describes United States retaliatory 
measures against the European Union from 1989 until 1996. The European Council continually 
refused to revoke the ban on United States bovine growth hormone products, and even implemented 
additional legislation. See also  note 27 (modifications to the initial bovine growth hormone 
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develop cystitis, which would then have to be treated with antibiotics that 
would end up in the beef and milk.45 Also, the EU defended its directive by 
claiming that the U.S. bovine industry was not banned from the EU entirely, 
because the Texas Beef industry sells non-BST beef to the EU.46 
C. The WTO Report 
After FDA approval of BST, the U.S. tried to recapture the lost EU 
market by turning to the WTO for support.47 The U.S. claimed the European 
Council’s actions violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)48 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).49 The U.S. further argued that the EU’s use of 
sanitation as the rationale support for the European Council’s measures 
affected international trade and discriminated against imports.50 The WTO 
formally responded to the U.S. complaint in August of 1997.51 In its initial 
report, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)52 clarified the reason for 
 
 
legislation). 
 45. Antibiotics are normally used to treat the cystitis. Large number of cows injected with BST 
need antibiotics, which build up in the muscle tissue of the animal and are discharged in its milk. 
Muscle composes the majority of consumable beef. The United States maintained that antibiotics were 
only found in the beef and milk in “trace” amounts that would not injure the consumer. This health 
concern is the same which inspires U.S. consumers to purchase organic milk.  
 46. Texas beef packers refused to use bovine growth hormone and were able to maintain beef 
trade with the EU. The continuing relationship was exploited by the EU to demonstrate that the entire 
United States trade market had not been targeted.  
 47. The WTO Decision, supra note 12, WTO Appellate Decision, supra note 11, and WTO 
Arbitration Report, supra note 14, have been reviewed in recent publications. See, e.g., Pierre V.F. 
Bos & Marco M. Slotboom, The EC Technology Transfer Regulation-A Practitioner’s Perspective, 32 
INT’L LAW. 1 (1998); Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-Science 
Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in  the Growth Hormones 
Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 251 (1998). The primary focus of this Note is of the impact WTO 
decisions may have on the future of restrictive trade regulations, primarily between the United States 
and the EU.  
 48. This section of GATT provides that restraints on trade are allowed if the restraints are for 
sanitary or phytosanitary purposes that are necessary to preserve the health and safety of the citizens of 
the member state. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Pmbl., Marrakesh Agreement Establishng the World Trade Organization, 
reprinted IN 1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE WORLD T RADE ORGANIZATION (1995). 
 49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat . 1336, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. 
 50. See WTO Decision, supra note 12.  The U.S. argued that if the EU banned BST products for 
reasons other than sanitary measures, then EU ban was in violation of the TBT Agreement. See section 
“Claims of the Parties” for a further description of the arguments made to the WTO. 
 51. See WTO Decision, supra note 12. 
 52. The Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization is the body that sits in 
judgment of all disputes that arise under GATT. After the Dispute Settlement Body files an initial 
report, the decision can be reviewed by the Appellate Body, as in the BST case, and an Appellate 
Report will be issued. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/12
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the European Commission’s actions. Representatives of the European 
Commission argued that the hormone-injected animals were not “like”53 
other animals and, even if they were like other animals, there was no unfair 
bias in favor of domestic animals.54 
In 1997, the WTO’s DSB finally came to a decision in favor of the U.S. 
and other countries that had joined the complaint in the BST case.55 The DSB 
found specifically that the EU had acted inconsistently with international 
agreements, and recommended that the European Commission’s measures be 
brought in conformity with its international obligations.56 The EU appealed 
the decision in September of 1997, claiming that the DSB had erred in its 
interpretation of the SPS Agreement and that risk assessment was not 
relevant to the trade issue.57 The EU further argued that the desires of its 
constituency should be a factor considered by the WTO’s DSB.58 
The U.S., in turn, appealed the WTO’s initial decision, seeking findings 
of additional violations of the SPS Agreement.59 The U.S. also rebutted the 
assertions of the EU regarding the “precautionary principle,” which dictates 
that a state can be preemptively cautious in setting health standards.60 The 
 
 
 53. The EU argued that the BST -injected animals did not meet the requirement of being the same 
products imported into the EU as those within the EU. See WTO Decision, supra note 12. If the EU 
succeeded in this argument, then there would not be evidence of discrimination against “like 
products,” and there would be no violation of GATT.  
 54. The EU claimed that Article III(4) of GATT was not violated, and that the measures were 
justified by Article XX(b) concerning human and animal health. See WTO Decision, supra note 12 at 
14. 
 55. Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada joined the U.S.’s complaint. See Edmund L. 
Andrews, In Victory for U.S., Europe Ban on Treated Beef is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. TIMES May 9, 1997, 
at A1. 
 56. See WTO Decision, supra  note 12, at 200-01. The Conclusion of the World Trade 
Organization Report states the following:  
(i) The European Communities, by maintaining sanitary measures which are not based on a risk 
assessment, has acted inconsistently with the requirements contained in Article 5.1 of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary Measures; (ii) The European Communities, by adopting 
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of sanitary protection it considers to be 
appropriate in different situations which result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, has acted inconsistently with the requirements contained in Article 5.5 of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and (iii) The European 
Communities, by maintaining sanitary measures which are not based in existing international 
standards without justification under Article 3.3 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures, has acted inconsistently with the requirements contained in Article 
3.1 of that Agreement.  
Id at 201. The WTO further “recommend[ed] that the Dispute Settlement Body requests the European 
Communities to bring its measures in dispute into conformity with its obligations under the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.” Id. at 201. 
 57. See WTO Appellate Report, supra  note 11. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 26-28. 
 60. The EU argued that, as a matter of customary international law, there existed a precautionary 
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Appellate Body refused to address the highly debated “precautionary 
principle,” stating that such an evaluation was irrelevant to the outcome of 
the case.61 The Body did conclude that the EU’s measurers were not 
consistent with of the SPS Agreement, and mandated that the EU comply 
with the treaty.62 
The U.S.’s victory has been curtailed by the EU’s failure to comply and 
the lack of international resources to enforce the WTO decision.63 Recently, a 
Hearing of the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means 
Committee addressed this issue.64 In that hearing, Charlene Barshefsky, trade 
representative, announced that the U.S. will “not tolerate failure to comply 
with trade agreements or the WTO rules,” even as the U.S. embarks on a 
Trans-Atlantic Economic Partnership trade agreement with the EU.65 
Barshefsky also emphasized the importance of the U.S./EU trade relationship 
and continued cooperation.66 
III. THE HISTORY OF BOVINE SOMATOTROPIN ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) 
When examining the present trade dispute between the U.S. and EU, it is 
important to note the international foundation for the dispute.67 Fear of “mad 
cow disease”68 was prevalent throughout the international beef market in the 
1990’s, when the United Kingdom faced a cumbersome of cow’s brain. The 
form of the disease that affects humans is called Creutzfeld Jakob Disease 
 
 
principle permitting a state to be cautious in setting health standards when scientific uncertainty exists. 
Id. at 7 and 17-18. 
 61. See id.  
 62. See id. at 98-101. 
 63. See WTO Arbitration, supra note 14. The Arbitrator determined that fifteen months would be 
a reasonable period of time for the EU to comply with the Articles of the SPS Agreement. He denied 
the EU time to perform a risk assessment, but granted more time than the U.S. asserted was reasonable 
for compliance. 
 64. See Trade Hearing, supra  note 6. 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. See id. at 6.  
 67. The present dispute concerns cosmetic ingredient regulating legislation proposed by the 
European Commission directed at preventing the spread of BSE. The European Commission proposed 
a directive in March of 1998 that would ban the import of cosmetic products containing certain bovine 
materials. See Commission Directive 98/16/EC, art. 2, 1998 OJ (L 77) 44 (“cosmet ic products 
containing the substances set out in the Annex cannot be placed on the Market from 1 April, 1998. 
Once in effect, this directive would prevent billions of dollars of U.S. cosmetic products from entering 
the Europe Union. 
 68. BSE is popularly known throughout the world as “mad cow disease.” In the United 
Kingdom, with the first report of BSE in 1985, the disease earned the name “mad cow disease” creates 
holes in the brain, causing animals to behave unusually.” The term is still used in popular publications. 
E.g., Matt Ridley, Mad Cows, a Study in Official Lunacy Acid Test, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 
19, 1998, at 22. 
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(“CJD”) and is terminal, working quickly to destroy the brain.69 The reaction 
of the EU was to enact legislation that regulated imported and intra-
community bovine materials and placed a ban on British beef. The U.S. took 
similar measures that included a ban on Canadian beef.70 
A. Mad Cow Disease in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s first reported case of BSE was in 1986.71 From 
that point on, the United Kingdom took measures to restrict the spread of the 
disease. These efforts intensified once scientists determined that 
contaminated feed containing animal parts caused the disease.72 As scientists 
learned more about the disease, they discovered a link between BSE and 
CJD,73 and the European Commission and other non-member states banned 
the import of United Kingdom beef.74 
United Kingdom beef has been banned from the EU since 1996.75 The 
British beef ban has created tension within the European community, 
especially since the United Kingdom has complied with EU directives and 
public health measures. The United Kingdom filed suit against the EU in the 
European Court of Justice to lift the ban.76 The most recent decision, on May 
5, 1998, dismissed the United Kingdom’s complaint asking that the 
temporary emergency measures be lifted for policy reasons.77 The court 
denied the appeal because of public health concerns.78 
By contrast, the United Kingdom is largely concerned with its beef 
industry and the economic welfare of its people.79 Grazing lands are being 
 
 
 69. See Dolly the Sheep Helps Battle for BSE Cure, BIRMINGHAM POST, Oct. 22, 1998, at 28. 
The disease is characterized by the mutation of prions, or brain proteins and is called scrapie in sheep. 
See id. The duration of the illness is six months or less. See generally DONALD VOET & JUDITH G. 
VOET, BIOCHEMISTRY  1026-28. 
 70. The United States restricted the importation of Canadian beef because the country received 
shipments of beef from the United Kingdom. 104 CONG. REC. S3159 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996). 
 71. Case C-180/96, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission, 1998 
ECJ CELEX LEXIS 4915, at *8 (1998). See also Ridley, supra  note 68. 
 72. See id. at *9. 
 73. See sources cited supra  note 70. By 1996, ten people had died of the human form of BSE, 
although thousands of cows had been slaughtered because of potential contamination and as of 
October 1998, 28 people had died of the disease in the United Kingdom. 
 74. See United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, 1998 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 4915, at 
*12. 
 75. See id. at *14. 
 76. See id.  
 77. See id. at *66. 
 78. See id. at *59-63. 
 79. As one commentator noted, [t]he livelihoods of thousands [of farmers] are at stake and their 
plight could not only affect what we eat but also the look of the British landscape.” James Meikle, 
Farmers Despair as Livings Collapse with the Crashing Markets, GUARDIAN, Oct. 3, 1998, at 4. 
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converted into crop land, creating new problems for farmers.80 The rate of 
suicide among farmers in the United Kingdom has increased since the ban on 
British beef began in 1996.81 The devastation of the British beef industry has 
led to violations of EU law as smugglers have attempted to bring banned beef 
into the EU market.82 The United Kingdom claims that the beef is now safe 
and BSE has been eradicated, but both the EU and the world beef market 
remain cautious about opening the doors to British beef.83 
B. The Human Strain of BSE 
A motivating factor for the world ban upon British beef was the 
connection between BSE and Creutzfeld Jakob Disease, a human strain of 
spongiform encephelopathy. Scientists have discovered BSE is transmissible 
to humans through certain risk materials in infected cows.84 The disease’s 
long incubation period in both humans and animals creates difficulty in 
researching and identifying the origin of the disease.85 The progression of the 
disease is similar in cows and humans. In both cows and humans, the disease 
causes deterioration of brain tissue, creating holes, leaving the brain looking 
much like a sponge.86 Both the human and bovine forms of the disease highly 
 
 
 80. See, Boris Worrall, Battle Under Way to Save Disappearing Hedgerows,  BIRMINGHAM POST, 
Oct. 22, 1998, at 4. The United Kingdom has now placed the farmers in a difficult situation. Because 
the changing of grazing land into crop land would require the removal of some aesthetic hedgerows, 
the United Kingdom is enforcing legislation that restricts farmers from uprooting hedgerows. The 
farmers are now caught between the need to plant crops for survival and the landscape regulations 
meant to protect the picturesque hedgerows. See id. 
 81. See Meikle, supra  note 79. Farmers were found to be “ten times more likely to kill 
themselves with firearms than other men.” Id. 
 82. See Mad Cow Disease: Massive Beef Export Fraud Uncovered, EUR. REP., Sept. 3, 1997, 
available in  1997 WL 13046321 [hereinafter Beef Export Fraud]. A German meat importer may have 
been knowingly importing beef from the United Kingdom in violation of the EU ban. See id. In July of 
1997, authorities uncovered a similar Belgian “beef smuggling operation.” Id.  
 83. The EU has been providing subsidies to British farmers and, due to the unsettled question of 
the extent of harm from the beef, the EU refuses to lift the ban. See David Steele, Beef on Bone Ban to 
Stay; Meat Trade Dismayed, HERALD, Jan. 23, 1999, at 2. 
 84. Steve Connor, Science: How Many More will Die? Scientists Attempting to Estimate the 
Numbers Likely to Die from the Human Version of “Mad Cow Disease” Have Some Important New 
Clues that Could Help Direct Their Research, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Jan. 15, 1999, at 9. But see 
Case C-103/96, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission, 1998 ECJ 
CELEX LEXIS 4195, at *72. In 1996, the Scientific Veterinary Committee of the EU claimed that 
there was no poven connection between BSE and any human disease. See id. 
 85. See Connor, supra  note 84. Scientists must know four things in order to “guess” at the size of 
what could be a Creutzefeldt Jakob Disease (CJD) epidemic: 1) an estimate of the total amount of 
tainted beef products consumed in the eighties, 2) the length of incubation, if any, in humans, 3) an 
understanding of the “species barrier” between humans and cows, and 4) the role of genetics in the 
post -consumption human reaction to BSE. Id.  
 86. See id. Testing has also been done on mice in order to determine how genetics can create 
different reactions to BSE. See id. See also  S.B. Prusiner, Prions, 95 P ROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 
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transmissible.87 
Due to the nature of the illness, it is difficult to determine if the British 
beef ban and the regulation of bovine materials in the EU has been effective 
in retarding the spread of BSE and CJD. The continued risk of contracting a 
terminal human disease is, however, a viable health and safety concern. 
Thus, the international community is not in violation of any treaties in 
regulating potentially tainted beef or risk materials.88 
C. European Union Regulations 
The EU enacted an emergency measure in March 1996 to protect its 
member countries against BSE from the United Kingdom.89 This decision 
banned British beef products from the EU, and was stricter than any prior 
regulation or decision concerning British beef or bovine materials.90 This 
measure was only the beginning of increased bovine regulations. Fear of the 
human health repercussions of BSE led to additional legislation, some of 
which has been followed by the member states, and some of which has not.91 
The EU has regulated the movement of bovine animals in the community, 
the marketing and veterinary care of bovine animals, and the trading of 
bovine products, from ovaries and sperm to gelatins and non-beef products 
 
 
13363, 13363 (1998) (Stating that BSE and CJD are known prion diseases, describing findings from a 
mice study, and stating that treatment of prion diseases may be applied to other degenerative 
disorders). Humans, as well as bovines, lose balance and can lose all normal voluntary functioning 
within months. See id. After the voluntary actions are lost, the brain continues to deteriorate until all 
involuntary nerve endings (synapses) die from the disease as well, including the heart. See id. See also 
F.E. Cohen & S.B. Prusiner, Pathologic Conformations of Prion Proteins, 67 ANN. REV. BIOCHEM. 
793 (1998). 
 87. See John Von Radowitz, Tonsil Test Offers Hope of Early Warning on CJD, SCOTSMAN, Jan. 
15, 1999, at 2, available in 1999 WL 5806464. “[P]roteins that spread the disease cannot be cleaned 
from surgical instruments no matter how thoroughly they are sterilised.” Id. 
 88. The banning of British beef due to concern about BSE has been upheld in the Court of 
European Justice. See sources cited supra  note 70. Additionally, the issue of banning beef out of 
concern about BSE has not been contested in the WTO. It appears that health and safety concerns 
about food products are considered more justifiable when the effect upon human health is clear, as 
with BSE. 
 89. Commission Directive 96/239, 1996 O.J. (L 78) 47.  
 90. For prior bovine regulations, See Commission Decision 95/287, 1995 O.J. (L 181) 40 
(removing tissues with BSE from bovine meat), replacing Commission Decision 94/474, 1994 O.J. (L 
194) 96 (BSE protection measures), Commission Decision 90/200, 1990 O.J. (L 105) 24 (concerning 
bovine tissues and organs in relation to BSE) and 89/469; 92/290, O.J. 1992 (L 152) 37 (BSE 
protection with respect to bovine embryos); Commission Decision 97/1, 1996 O.J. (L 1) 3 (regulating 
bovine animal semen collection centers). See Case C-180-96, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v. Commission, 1998 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 4195 for a discussion of how these 
directives relate to each other.  
 91. The non-compliance has been largely confined to individuals acting against their own 
government’s mandates. See supra  note 82 and accompanying text.  
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from slaughtered animals. 
D. United States’ Reaction to BSE 
As in other areas of the world, the U.S. reacted to BSE by banning British 
beef from the U.S. market. Newspaper articles, talk shows,92 and trade 
discussions93 reflected the U.S.’s fear of BSE. Discussions of whether or not 
to eat beef accompanied proposed travel to European countries, especially 
the United Kingdom. The reaction of the domestic beef market soon became 
a promotion of “BSE free” U.S. beef. 
Recently, a popular television program faced a civil lawsuit filed by the 
Texas beef industry for slander when BSE was mentioned in connection with 
U.S. beef on the program.94 On March 28, 1996, the day after the European 
Commission decided to ban British beef, the U.S.’s Senate proposed a ban on 
Canadian beef because Canada had received shipments of British beef.95 This 
reaction is similar to the EU’s in ban on all British beef from the rest of the 
member states.96  
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S BAN OF COSMETICS DUE TO BSE 
In the E.C. directive proposed in March 1998,97 the EU proposed a ban on 
cosmetic products containing certain bovine risk materials produced after 
April 1, 1998 from the European marketplace. This directive bans specified 
 
 
 92. Oprah Winfrey, a popular American talk show host, hosted a program titled “Dangerous 
Food” in which American beef was discussed in relation to BSE. See Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 
201 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 93. See Trade Hearing, supra  note 6. 
 94. See Texas Beef Group, 201 F.3d 680, 682. 
 95. 104 CONG. REC. S3159 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996). This measure was proposed in order to 
retaliate against Canada for banning all U.S. grain, including Midwest grain, from Canada due to 
karnal bunt found in Arizona.  
 96. The U.S. claimed that the regulation of bovine products should not apply to them because of 
the reliability of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) research. However, the U.S. uses the same 
tactics as the EU. For example, the U.S. banned Canadian beef after Canada banned U.S. grains. See 
supra  note 95. Both countries justified the bans by noting possible health threats. The Canadian 
legislation appears to be a retaliatory measure against the U.S., yet the U.S. is not “tolerating” any 
protectionism on the part of the EU. 
 97. Commission Directive 98/16, O.J. (L 77) 44-46 (adapting to technical progress Annexes II, 
III, VI, and VII to Council Directive 76/768 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to cosmetic products). Art icle 2 states: 
“Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the cosmetic products containing 
the substances set out in the Annex cannot be placed on the Market from 1 April 1998. This does 
not apply to products produced before 1 April 1998. Member states may retain in force those 
measures implementing Directive 97/1/EC until 1 April 1998.” 
Id. 
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risk materials (SRMs) including gelatins, tissues and fluids from the 
encephalon, the spinal cord, and the eyes.98 These materials, the E.C. 
suggests, are dangerous due to the potential spread of BSE.99 However, the 
EU Farm Council has decided to postpone the ban on SRMs until a further 
determination can be made as to whether the risk materials actually host 
BSE.100 Additionally, the European Council refused to enact the Commission 
legislation as it was drafted and has yet to approve new legislation proposed 
by the European Commission.101 One explanation for this postponement is 
the ban’s extensive effect on the pharmaceutical, cosmetic, and even tire 
industries, as well as its potential ill effects on international beef trade.102 
This delay has given the U.S. a brief period of time to determine what 
measures must be taken in order to maintain desired relations with the EU.103 
The U.S. has won a preliminary trade dispute with the EU on the use of 
tallow in cosmetic products.104 The tallow trade negotiations stopped the EU 
from halting the U.S.’s one hundred million dollar per year trade in cosmetics 
with the EU.105 The dispute is not over, however, because the communities 
have not come to an agreement as to gelatine materials from cows. 
 
 
 98. See Commission Directive 97/1, 1997 O.J. (L 16) 85 (amending Directive 76/786 to prohibit, 
temporarily, the use of bovine tissues and fluids from the encephalon, the spinal cord and the eyes in 
cosmetic products in the EU market). 
 99. Decision 97/534/EC of July 1997 sets forth the prohibitions in the EU on the basis of fear of 
BSE. See Commission Decision 97/534 1997 O.J. (L. 216) 95-98. 
 100. See Mad Cow Disease: Farm Council Defines Commission, Delays Ban on SRMs Until 1999, 
EUROPEAN REPORT, Apr. 4, 1998 (“EU Agricultural Ministers decided on March 31 to postpone a ban 
on specified risk materials (SRM) from cattle until January 1, 1999.”) [hereinafter Farm Council 
Defies Commission].  
 101. See id . 
 102. See id. 
 103. “The United States, which has no reported cases of BSE, has complained that the cost of 
removing SRMs from billions of Dollars (sic) of meat exports every year would be excessive.” Id. See 
also Trade Hearing, supra  note 6  
 104. See Mad Cow Disease: Tallow Safer than Gelatine, Says Scientific Steering Committee, EUR. 
REP., Feb. 25, 1998, available in  1998 WL 8800710. Scientists remain cautious of deeming gelatines 
safe, and consider three issues:  
the risk of human exposure to BSE from direct consumption of potentially infective material; the 
risk incurred in being exposed to processed infective material such as tallow (use[d] in making 
soaps, candles and machinery grease, for example) and gelatine (used in cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals and food additives); and the risk of infection through recycling infective material 
via its use in animal feed.  
Id. 
 105. See Beef Export Fraud, supra  note 82 at 2. 
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A. Effects of the European Union’s Legislation on the United States Beef 
Industry 
A EU cosmetics ban would place the U.S. beef industry in a greater 
uproar than that caused by the BST ban, primarily because the U.S. bovine 
industry claims that there is no BSE in the U.S.106 The passing of the EU 
directive would take away a market for the bovine materials referred to as 
specified risk materials (SRMs). Some of the E.C. specified products 
currently move in U.S. trade, originating in the beef industry. The money lost 
by the beef industry alone would amount to millions of U.S. dollars annually. 
Small dairy farmers cannot afford to lose the export market in these bovine 
by-products.107 
B. Effects of the European Union’s Legislation on the United States’ 
Pharmaceutical and Cosmetic Industries 
The E.C.’s proposed legisla tion would prohibit billions of dollars worth 
of U.S. cosmetics from entering the EU market.108 The EU claims that U.S. 
cosmetics present a risk of Creutizfeld-Jakob because U.S. cosmetic 
manufacturers use SRMs in their products. Yet, the U.S. claims that there is 
no reported BSE in the U.S. If this is true, the ban of U.S. products does not 
make sense as a protection of human health and is thus an unnecessary 
restriction on trade. If there is no BSE in the U.S., whether SRMs could 
harbor BSE is irrelevant because U.S. produced materials are not 
contaminated. 
C. Implications of Postponement for the United States 
The U.S. is likely to retaliate if the EU passes the proposed legislation.109 
The U.S.’s response to postponement was evident in a trade subcommittee 
hearing in the House of Representatives.110 In her testimony, Charlene 
 
 
 106. See Bud Brewster, BSE Threatens EU Tallow and Gelatin Supplies, COSMETICS & 
T OILETRIES, Dec. 1, 1997, at 11. 
 107. In light of the financial strain the BST has placed on the smaller milk producers and cattle 
farmers, the reduction of the market for bovine by-products in the U.S. could prove to be more harmful 
than some farmers are capable of enduring economically. See Marden, supra note 40. 
 108. See Trade Hearing, supra  note 6. 
 109. The WTO was formed for the purpose of avoiding unilateral actions to enforce the GATT. 
See Julie Goldman, Bad Lawyering or Ulterior Motive? Why the United States Lost the Film Case 
Before the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 417, 417 (1999). The U.S. 
may take the issue to the WTO (although that is a time consuming prospect) or it may pass equally 
damaging restrictions on trade with the EU. See Trade Hearing, supra  note 6.  
 110. See Trade Hearing, supra  note 6. 
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Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative, reporting on the WTO’s 
decision affecting trade relations, stated that the U.S. would take action with 
respect to the cosmetic ban because such directives “would not be tolerated” 
by the U.S.111 During the hearing, a Trans-Atlantic partnership was proposed 
that would address this trade issue and other concerns about the EU 
relationship.112 
The postponement of the enactment of such trade-limiting legislation 
merely postpones the inevitable trade war. Only by the cooperative efforts of 
the U.S. and EU governments can a trade war be avoided.113 The 
Transatlantic trade agreements may be a solution for the U.S. and EU, 
providing an opportunity to work together and resolve the bovine disputes.114 
Most importantly, postponement of the EU legislation restricting 
cosmetics containing SRMs gives the U.S. time to resolve the situation 
through negotiation.115 Should trade negotiation not lead to a solution, the 
postponement also gives the U.S. an opportunity to prepare a proper response 
to the legislation, whether through compliance or trade retaliation.116 These 
possible responses will be explored in detail below, but cannot be fully 
understood without consideration of the reasons for the proposed legislation. 
V. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COSMETIC LEGISLATION 
AND OTHER BOVINE TRADE DISPUTES 
A. Protectionism 
The U.S.’s first reaction to a new trade restriction is to claim that the 
restriction is a protectionist measure.117 The restriction in this case affects 
$4.5 billion in trade of U.S. cosmetics.118 The U.S.’s contention that there is 
 
 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See Farm Council Defies Commission, supra note 100. By working together to come to an 
understanding of trade requirements, the U.S. and EU were able to stop the banning of tallow 
regulations, and postpone the date of gelatine material regulation. See id. 
 114. See Trade Hearing, supra  note 6. 
 115. See id . The continued trade discussions are currently taking place, allowing the parties to 
come to an agreement on gelatine and other materials.  
 116. See Gary Yerkey & J. Kirwin, U.S. Meet Again in Attempt to Avert Trade War over Farm 
Products, 14 INT’L T RADE REP. 688 (1997) (explaining that the U.S. threatened to ban over $300 
million in EU meat for safety reasons in retaliation for failing to come to an agreement on trade 
issues); Both compliance and retaliation have been used in the past by the U.S., such as when the U.S. 
turned to the WTO to resolve the BST trade dispute.  
 117. See Barry James, A Trans-Atlantic Beef; EU Threatens U.S. Meat Ban Over Inspections, 
INT’L HERALD T RIBUNE, Dec. 19, 1997, at 1 (Washington described the cosmetics ban by the EU as 
protectionist). 
 118. See Trade Hearing, supra note 6. 
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no BSE in the U.S., if true, would support the theory that the ban is a 
protectionist, unnecessary restriction on trade.119 
The EU’s traditional response that the measure is equally applicable to 
member states and third parties has not been accepted by the international 
community.120 This argument has been rejected by the EU’s own courts, 
primarily because protectionism is still discriminatory.121 The EU courts’ 
reasoning is analogous to the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause,122 and 
its restrictions on states’ unfair trade practices.123 The basic treaty of the 
EU124 provides that the EU member states may not restrict trade between 
states.125 Exceptions to this standard rule allow restriction of trade for several 
specific reasons, most importantly to protect human health.126 Still, these 
exceptions to free trade may not be used as “arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade.”127 Similarly, in the U.S., a restriction may be 
 
 
 119. See Tore Wilhelmsen As v. Oslo Kommune, [1997] 3 CMLR 823 at 869 (State monopoly on 
beer is incompatible with Article 16 of the EEZ; there is no right to discriminate between domestic 
products and Member States’ products). See also Steven J. Rothberg, Note, From Beer to BST: 
Circumventing the GATT Standards Code’s Prohibition on Unnecessary Obstacles to Trade, 75 MINN. 
L. REV. 505, 511-17 (1990). 
 120. For an analysis of protectionism and the way it functions in the international community, see 
Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 
(1999).  
 121. See id . at 4-5. The EU ruled that certain regulations of German beer were unnecessary 
restrictions on trade, even though the restriction applies equally to member states and third countries. 
 122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause provides: “Congress shall have the Power . . . [3] To 
regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes.” Id. 
 123. See Rothberg, supra  note 119, at 529. Rothberg examines Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 
340 U.S. 349 (1951), in which the court held that regardless of the purported health and safety 
concerns of the City of Madison, there must be legitimate reasons for imposing the standards or 
requirements. See Sean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354-56. Although the legislation in Dean Milk appeared 
to be neutral on its face, it discriminated against the movement of interstate commerce. Id. The court 
further stated that it did not matter that the state of Wisconsin was equally burdened as other states; the 
issue was the discrimination against other states. Id. This Note will pursue this analysis further with 
respect to the argument of the EU that its restriction falls equally upon member states and third parties.  
 124. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.TS. 11 
(1958) (hereinafter EEC Treaty). 
 125. See EEC Treaty, supra note 124 arts. 30–38, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 26-30 (Chapter 2, The 
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions between Member States). 
 126. See EEC Treaty, supra note 143, art. 36, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 29. 
 127. See id. Article 36 states in whole: 
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 inclusive shall not be an obstacle to prohibitions or restrictions 
in respect of importation, exportation or transit which are justified on grounds of public morality, 
public order, public safety, the protection of human or animal life or health, the preservation of 
plant life, the protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or archeological value or the 
protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, 
however, constitute either a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between member states.  
Id. 
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invalid although it applies equally to the legislating state and other states.128 
B. Safeguarding of Cultural Values 
The EU argued in its appeal to the WTO that public perception should be 
a factor in legislative assessment.129 In essence, the EU essentially argued 
that the public should be able to determine the level of protection from their 
own governing body. This assertion is a cultural argument as well as a legal 
one. The members of the EU may have a cultural predisposition towards 
naturally processed and untainted food products. A recent article examined 
the cultural aspects of the European BST restrictions,130 focusing on natural 
food preparation processes that often are considered unsanitary by U.S. 
standards.131 Standard U.S. food preparation is considered “processing” by 
EU standards.132 These cultural differences may be the basis for the EU 
allowing natural and traditional processing techniques and cautioning against 
technological processes and “novel” foods.133 
The cultural differences are not as clear or distinct, however, when 
applied to the recent cosmetic legislation.134 The relevant difference could be 
identified as the European distaste for mass production. Today, however, in 
light of the number of European and international consumers, EU production 
of items such as cosmetic products needs to progress at high rates to keep up 
with the market. This high demand within the EU and the cultural 
expectation of natural items may conflict with each other. It is necessary, in 
order to meet the demand without imported “processed” items, for the 
European industries to produce in mass quantities. Thus, the EU cannot 
reasonably claim that cultural distaste for mass production justifies its ban on 
U.S. bovine products. 
An alternative argument of the EU is the support of European preference 
for traditional instead of technological methods of processing.135 This is a 
 
 
 128. See supra  note 121.  
 129. See WTO Appellate Decision, supra  note 10 at 14. 
 130. Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United States: 
Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525 (1998). 
 131. See id. at 531 & n.31. 
 132. See id. at 531-32 & n.30. The article suggests that the cultural differences between the U.S. 
and the EU are the reasons for the excessive legislation enacted by the EU. See id. 
 133. See id. at 543.  
 134. Professor Echols’s article primarily addressed the cultural aspects of food, not the cultural 
aspects of cosmetics or other products. See id. 
 135. The genetic engineering argument is a difficult one to address. The growth of genetically 
engineered materials is fast-paced and consuming, covering many aspects of trade. See Bill 
Lambrecht, Critics Vilify New Seed Technology that Monsanto may Soon Control, ST. LOUIS POST 
DISPATCH , Nov. 1, 1998, at A1 (new genetic technology will render the seeds of crops sterile so 
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rational basis for disfavoring U.S.’s cosmetic products, but it is less 
persuasive when the disputed item is a natural substance. Regardless of how 
a cosmetic is actually produced, when the restriction applies to the 
ingredients, here the bovine gelatins, only the ingredients are culturally 
significant. Where the disputed ingredients are not genetically altered or 
hormone injected bovine products but natural bovine products that have been 
used for years in the manufacturing of cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, the 
“natural” cultural argument breaks down. Moreover, it would be difficult to 
argue that the European Community has a unique cultural predisposition to 
keep BSE (or SRMs) out of its products, especially since BSE is “an agreed 
risk.”136 
Alternatively, the EU or cultural difference supporters might assert that 
the BSE epidemic is the result of altering nature. The traditional cultural 
expectations of the European community suggest that the products produced 
and purchased within the community are natural, meaning untainted. For 
example, when BSE was first detected in the United Kingdom, the origin was 
determined to be the mashed sheep parts in the bovine feed.137 Cows do not 
normally eat animal parts, so the spread of the disease can be attributed to 
“unnatural” human interference. This line of reasoning helps explain the 
EU’s extensive legislation protecting against a repeat of the BSE episode in 
the United Kingdom.138 Although the explanation for food product 
legislation is now clear, there is still no evidence of how the cultural 
argument applies to cosmetics, or whether such an explanation matters in the 
world trade community.139 Further, this cultural reasoning may not apply to 
 
 
farmers are only able to use genetically engineered seeds). Two specific areas affected by 
advancements in technology are cosmetics and pharmaceuticals. See Juan Enriquez, Genomics and the 
World’s Economy; Policy Forum: Genomics, 281 SCIENCE  925 (1998). The world is facing a great 
deal of change, as well as risks, with the development of genetic engineering. See id. Three key risks 
include the effect of rising and falling technology companies on the international stock market, failure 
to fully review and test products because of pressure to introduce the products into the economy, and 
knowledge gaps that could lead to problems such as the recent mad cow disease crisis in the United 
Kingdom.” See id. 
 136. See Echols, supra  note 130, at 542. 
 137. Since cows are vegetarians, such an alteration of their food supply appears inconsistent with 
EU cultural expectations as described in Professor Echols’s article. See supra note 130-134 and 
accompanying text.  
 138. See Echols, supra  note 130, at 540-43. Altering nature is a prevalent topic in the media today. 
The EU’s legislation appears to support the theory that European’s prefer natural products, especially 
since they do not know what the future will bring alterations in nature. An “epidemic” similar to the 
BSE crisis could happen again in any context, from tainted tomatoes to genetically modified soybeans. 
See Connor, supra  note 84. 
 139. Echols suggests that the cultural explanation does not satisfy the world trade community, but 
offers a tangible reasoning. See Echols, supra note 130.  
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cosmetic legislation because cosmetics are not food products.140 
Additionally, the alternative to the bovine gelatins in the cosmetic products is 
a bioengineered product called Xgel FS. Without bovine products, cosmetics 
manufacturers will have to use this synthetic substitute, resulting in cosmetics 
that are inconsistent with the cultural traditions of the European Union.141 
C. Health and Safety Concerns 
Finally, health and safety may be a legitimate reason for the EU cosmetic 
legislation if scientific findings support the potential danger of bovine 
gelatines.142 Scientific analysis must determine the potential for BSE 
contamination of the SRMs as well as whether the use of SRMs in 
pharmaceutical and cosmetic products could actually cause the human form 
of BSE. The WTO might decide that the concern and the restriction on trade 
of such products is valid, but only for products whose ingredients or risk 
ingredients originate in a state that has BSE. The U.S. contention that there is 
no BSE in the U.S.,143 however, undermines the argument that the restriction 
is purely not for health and safety concerns.144 
Additionally, postponement by the European Community is inconsistent 
with purported health and safety concerns. If it was genuinely concerned 
about the introduction of contaminated products into the market, the EU 
would probably not wait to enact the pertinent legislation. Further, the cows 
that will be used after March 1999 should be healthy BSE-free animals, even 
if they come from the United Kingdom.145 These two factors make the EU’s 
 
 
 140. See supra  note 139. The issue on the cosmetics legislation may boil down to the argument 
that the total risks from U.S. cosmetics are unknown 
 141. See Bioprogress Acquisition of DHA Nutrition Expands Product Line, Adds Distribution, 
BUS.  WIRE , Aug. 11, 1998(examination of biologically engineered products that replace bovine 
gelatins in pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, specifically, the XGel FS process for soft capsules).  
 142. These “ifs” have yet to be resolved by scientists. This is purportedly one of the explanations 
for the postponement of the enactment of the cosmetic legislation. 
 143. Although there is no evidence that conflicts with the U.S.’s contention that is it BSE free, 
CJD and scrapie are not foreign to the U.S. In March 1999, at least two individuals have been 
diagnosed with CJD, both of whom were deer hunters (one from Missouri and one from Utah). The 
prion-related diseases have been present for at least 15 years in the U.S. as evidenced by the research 
of Dr. Prusiner. See supra  note 86 and accompanying text.  
 144. It is important to note that one of the European concerns is that the British hid the tainted 
beef problem in the 1980s and it is not clear whether the United States, or any other nation is doing, or 
has done, the same. Additionally, the BSE has been found in Switzerland, an unsuspected locale. The 
EU can dispute the argument that BSE is not presently in the U.S. by emphasizing the lack of 
knowledge about the disease. 
 145. The killing of animals in the late 1980s should have removed the risk of BSE from the United 
Kingdom. All animals under 30 months old (the five year latency period of BSE in cows) were 
slaughtered. All of the at -risk cows were not slaughtered, however. This could be an explanation for a 
continued risk in the United Kingdom. 
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health and safety argument less convincing. The longer the legislation is 
postponed, the less convinced the world population will be that it is a valid 
health restriction. 
D. Socio-Economic Power 
Similar to the protectionism theory, this theory suggests that the EU has 
an interest in dominating the world market. It is not interested in producing 
everything; rather, the EU is interested in regulating products to meet the 
community’s standards. The EU’s extensive and redundant legislation of 
bovine products supports this theory. 
This hypothesis is further supported by the timing of the proposal. 
Because of the WTO decision of August 1997, and the subsequent 
“temporary” banning of cosmetics, it is possible that the actions of the 
European Commission are retaliatory in nature. The Appellate Report of the 
beef hormone case issued in February of 1998, the same month as the new 
legislation.146 The European Commission may be seeking to obtain much 
greater control in the world marketplace than the Community presently 
holds. The continual revision of bovine legislation is merely one example of 
the way in which initially reasonable restrictions on trade are modified and 
enhanced, subtly, to the point where the restrictions unnecessarily encumber 
trade.147 Further, the initial purpose of banning BST products was socio-
economic, not health-related.148 The purpose of the cosmetic legislation may 
be the same. 
VI. FUTURE TRADE IMPLICATIONS 
Failing to work together will have repercussions for both the U.S. and the 
EU. For example, enforcement of the proposed cosmetic legislation may 
result in U.S.’s retaliation,149 or may cause the U.S. to seek assistance from 
the WTO.150 Since the U.S. and EU depend upon each other for a substantial 
 
 
 146. See WTO Appellate Decision, supra  note 11. 
 147. See Rothberg, supra  note 123, at 530-36. 
 148. See Refusal to Include Hormone in the List of Substances not Subject to MRLs Condemned, 
EU FOCUS, July 16, 1998, at 13. 
 149. This prospect seems likely in view of the fact that the U.S. reacted in this did to Canada’s 
restriction on grains. See, e.g.s  Karl Tao Greenfield, Banana Wars, A Trade Fight over Fruit 
Threatens to Spread to Other Food Groups, Clothes, and even Hobbies, TIME, Feb. 8, 1999, at 42. For 
more detailed information, see supra  notes 95-97.  
 150. Turning to the WTO for assistance is usually a last resort. See Trade Hearings, supra note 6. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. may seek WTO intervention as the U.S. did in the BST trade dispute. See WTO 
Decision, supra  note 12. 
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amount of trade each year,151 it would be in the economic and diplomatic 
interests of both communities to reach a compromise on the trade issues. This 
is particularly important because it is not clear how the WTO would decide 
this issue.152 
A. Essential Elements of a Trade Agreement 
If the U.S. and EU do choose to work together and enact the proposed 
Trans-Atlantic Trade Agreement, they may be able to come to an 
understanding beneficial to both governments and their citizens. In order for 
such a pact to be successful, especially in the case of the bovine regulations, 
the countries must come to an agreement regarding when a trade issue or 
dispute poses a genuine health and safety concern. It is important, in order to 
eliminate the scientific differences and disagreements, that the communities 
set consistent and equivalent standards of regulation to allow products 
accepted by the FDA to avoid re-inspection, testing, and additional approval 
procedures.153 
Other specific issues that need to be addressed include product standards, 
pre-dispute procedures, early dispute settlement, and post-dispute resolution. 
The most controversial of these issues is product standards, because this 
would require addressing all of the cultural and health concerns, as well as 
the scientific differences discussed in detail in this Note. But, by establishing 
minimum standards, both the EU and the U.S. can seek to meet minimum 
requirements and develop a method for dealing with specific requirements. 
To avoid extended controversy when a dispute arises, such as the BST 
dispute over the side effects of BST, in compliance with the product standard 
the U.S. manufacturer should first meet a minimum research time or quality 
requirement aligned with the agreement that is specific to “scientific 
discoveries” for particular end products. That is, the requirement may be 
specific for food, cosmetics, or the like. As long as the relevant research and 
 
 
 151. See Trade Hearing, supra  note 6. 
 152. See Ryan David Thomas, Note, Where’s the Beef? Mad Cows and the Blight of the SPS 
Agreement, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 487, 510-16 (1999). This author argues that the WTO would 
uphold the ban on SRMs would be upheld by the WTO under the SPS agreement. Id. at 510-11. He 
bases his argument primarily on the identifiable risks of the materials in food products. Id. at 510-13. 
However, the concern in relation to pharmaceutical products is that they may be far enough removed 
from “food products.” Additionally, concerns remains about the validity of the scientific research that 
has been performed to date.  
 153. To provide a workable model for the Trans-Atlantic Trade Agreement, the U.S. and EU 
should look to existing trade agreements, such as NAFTA.  NAFTA addresses similar trade concerns, 
providing a model to deal with scientific, cultural, and health concerns. See NAFTA, Chapter seven: 
Agricultural and Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures. See also Part III, Chapter nine: Standards 
Related Measures.  
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findings are disclosed upon introduction of the product to the EU market, 
then the EU’s equivalent to the FDA can review the research. The agreement 
would outline a maximum time of review after which the product will be 
introduced to the European market. If the EU objects to the methods or 
results of the research for health and safety reasons, then the burden should 
be upon the manufacturer to prove that the product is safe for human 
consumption.154 If the EU rejects the product again, then, at the request of 
either party, the issue should be submitted to an arbitration panel composed 
of representatives from the U.S., EU, and a neutral third party. The research 
should then be examined to determine if it meets the standards and 
requirements of the agreement. If the research meets the standards outlined, 
and the panel determines that there is no health and safety concern, then the 
product should be introduced to the EU market. This process should also 
apply if the U.S. questioned EU products. 
The purpose of this method is to decrease, or eliminate, ex post facto 
product bans and retaliatory tariff increases. The agreement would require 
the parties to define reasons for rejecting products that are in accordance with 
the agreement. Also, manufacturers from the EU and from the U.S. will 
know exactly what “validation requirements” must be met to market the 
products. This agreement should also include a provision, similar to 
NAFTA’s, requirement that the review procedure for internal products be the 
same as that for external products.155 
The purpose of this agreement differs from that of NAFTA.156 The EU 
has different objectives and remains one of the three largest world 
competitors. This proposed agreement differs from the WTO, also, because it 
is a supplemental agreement designed to implement a procedure to ultimately 
 
 
 154. A suggested maximum length of time for review would be under six months. The 
manufacturer would then have three to six months to introduce further evidence that the product meets 
certain standards outlined in the agreement. 
 155. For example, the U.S. should not review European Products more strictly than American 
products, and the EU should not review American products more strictly than European products. If 
the standard is high, in general, then there is no unfair trade practices. In contrast, the different 
standards of review would indicate discrimination, which should be per se unfair and invalid trade 
practice under the new agreement. 
 156. The primary purpose of this proposed agreement is to determine standards and methods to 
avoid trade disputes arising with products. The agreement does allow for restrictions upon market 
access, but only for valid reasons. And the agreement should be relatively narrow and brief. NAFTA, 
however, is extensive and took years to implement. The NAFTA discussions began in the 1980’s, yet 
the treaty was not completed until August, 1993, with supplements in 1995. See The North American 
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 1993 W.L. 561124 (N.A.F.T.A.); Nafta Supplemental 
Agreement, available in 1995 WL 522861 (N.A.F.T.A.). The purpose of NAFTA was to begin “free 
trade” among the United States, Canada and Mexico. See NAFTA, supra note 4 at Part I, Chapter One: 
Objectives.  
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stop the trade disputes before they trigger WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
interference.157 When a settlement is not forthcoming in a dispute, then the 
WTO would be available to resolve the issue.158 That is, when the arbitration 
panel fails to come to an understanding, or the decision of the arbitrator is not 
implemented and the agreement is violated, then the party seeking to enforce 
the agreement could turn to the WTO for assistance.159 
B. Proposed Trans-Atlantic Treaty 
This Note will not set forth specific text for the proposed treaty. However, 
the text should be taken in part from elements of NAFTA that are familiar to 
and have been successful for the U.S. The Preamble 160 of the treaty should 
introduce the parties to the treaty and define the purposes for entering into the 
agreement as well as the benefits of entering into the treaty.161 The first 
 
 
 157. The creation of a basic agreement will assist in minor dispute settlement and address major 
concerns in an efficient and effective manner. Timeliness is most essential for some of the new 
products and scientific discoveries. The present situation is not efficient for solving timely issues. See, 
e.g., WTO Decision, supra note 12. The time table demonstrates the 2 years it took to come to a 
decision which still has not resolved the issue. 
 158. By entering into this agreement, the U.S. and the EU would not be turning away from the 
WTO as a dispute settlement body, but would be forming standards and an arbitration Panel, as has 
often been formed in the past. The difference with this panel is that it will settle multiple disputes 
under one theme: trade disputes between the U.S. and the EU. 
 159. For an in depth examination of problems surrounding the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and 
the Appellate Body, especially with regard to the Beef Hormone dispute, see Hughes,  
Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels: The WTO Appellate Body Beef Hormone 
Decision, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 915, 1999. Such problems with the WTO Dispute settlement 
process validate the need for an agreement to solve trade disputes before appealing to the WTO for 
assistance. See also  Joergens, Konstantin J. True Appellate Procedure or Only a Two-Stage Process? 
A Comparative View of the Appellate Body under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 30 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 193 (1999). 
 160. See The NAFTA Supplemental Agreements between the Government of the United States of 
America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the Mexican States North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Preamble, available in 1993 WL 792463 (N.A.F.T.A.). The 
language of the treaty has been changed to address the issue present in the agreement proposed here. 
 161.  
PREAMBLE 
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the European Union : 
Convinced of the importance of the continued relationship in trade matters and the essential role in 
cooperation in these areas in achieving sustainable development for the well-being of present and 
future generations; 
Reaffirming the sovereign right of States to protect their citizens from health or physical safety 
harm pursuant to their own product and scientific requirements and their responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the citizens of other states 
or of individuals beyond the control of the limits of national jurisdiction; 
Recognizing the interrelationship of their trade policies; 
Acknowledging the growing economic and social links between them; 
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chapter should set forth the objectives of the agreement.162 The second 
chapter should address “National Treatment and Market Access for 
Goods,”163 defining both scope and coverage (Article I)164 and national 
treatment (Article II).165 
The third chapter should address the more substantive issues of 
Standards-Related Measures.166 The fourth chapter of the Trans-Atlantic 
agreement should address “Institutional Arrangements and Dispute 
Settlement Procedures.”167 Although this is a skeleton format, these are the 
areas of greatest concern and impact to be addressed in a Trans-Atlantic 
Treaty between the U.S. and the EU. By establishing initial standards and 
 
 
Reaffirming the importance of trade goals and objectives of the GATT and WTO; 
Emphasizing the importance of public participation in producing quality and useful products and 
enhancing the quality of products presently available; 
Noting the existence of differences in their respective cultural expectations, and health and safety 
standards; 
Recalling their desire to support and build on international trade agreements and existing policies 
and laws, in order to promote cooperation between them; and 
Convinced of the benefits to be derived from a framework, including an Agreement, a cooperative 
Commission, and an Arbitration panel, to facilitate effective cooperation on the research and 
review of trade products, continued preservation of health and safety of its citizens, and 
enhancement of quality of life in their territories; 
Have agreed as follows: 
 162.  
Chapter 1: Objectives 
The objectives of this Agreement are to: 
foster the protection and improvement of trade relations in the territories of the Parties for the 
well-being of present and future generations; 
promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive trade and 
regulatory policies and standards; 
Support the trade goals and objectives of the GATT. 
Avoid creating trade disputes or new trade barriers; 
Strengthen the cooperation on the development and improvement of product standards, 
regulations, procedures, policies and practices; 
Enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, trade laws and regulations; 
Promote transparency and public and private participation in the development of trade practices, 
policies and regulations and product standards; 
Promote economically efficient review and regulation measures; and 
Promote prevention of violation, dispute settlement, and remedial measures.  
 163. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Part Two Trade in Goods, Chapter Three: 
National Treatment and Market Access for Goods, available in  1992 WL 812386 (N.A.F.T.A.). 
 164. See id. at Article 300. 
 165. See id . at Article 301. 
 166. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Part Three Technical Barriers to Trade, Chapter 
Nine: Standards-Related Measure available in  1992 WL 812393 (N.A.F.T.A.). 
 167. North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter Twenty: Institutional Arrangements and 
Dispute Settlement Procedures, available in  1992 WL 812402 (N.A.F.T.A.). 
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trade requirements, the U.S. and the EU will be able to conform both 
culturally and in industrial technology and development. Eventually, the 
standards could become as predictable as the requirements for FDA 
Approval in the U.S. 
The European Commission has already begun a similar, albeit unilateral, 
process with respect to its member nations.168 The latest proposed regulation 
regarding consumer protection from animal diseases attempts to outline 
regulation guidelines for determinations of potential danger of transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). This proposed regulation addresses the 
important issues underlying these trade disputes. If the U.S. integrates the 
process already begun in the EU into the proposed treaty, the process of 
aligning the communities’ interests will commence. 
C. Problems with Compromise 
The U.S. will have to make concessions in coming to an agreement with 
the EU on product standards.169 In turn, the EU would allow FDA approved 
drugs or food into the EU market.170 An underlying requirement of this 
compromise is that the two governments adopt the same objectives. I propose 
that the objectives should be to protect the physical health of the community 
while promoting economic growth and scientific truths. 
Unfortunately, this type of cooperative trade practice has proven 
difficult.171 Although the time may be approaching when the U.S. and EU 
 
 
 168. 1999 OJ C 45. The European Commission proposed a regulation entitled “Proposal for 
European Parliament and Council Regulation laying down rules for the prevention and control of 
certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies.” Id. This regulation attempts to set forth 
guidelines for determining when a BSE danger exists, identifying BSE free countries and regions, and 
creating rules for preventing the spread of TSEs. This proposed regulation specifically does not apply 
to “cosmetic or medicinal products.” See id. at Article 1, paragraph 2(a). 
 169. See Franz X. Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP . L. 515, 582 (1998) (explaining that the United States excludes imports of food 
products containing more pesticides than tolerated by United States legislation). Similarly, the EU 
does not allow food products with more maximum residue limits (MRLs) than EU legislation allows. 
An example of compromise on product standards would be the U.S. allowing cheese considered 
acceptable by the EU’s health and safety standards into the U.S. market. 
 170. A genuine concern for the U.S. government and people is whether or not the present issue of 
the cosmetics regulation is a valid BSE threat. See Barbara McMahon, US Considers Blood Ban over 
Mad Cow Fears, EVENING STANDARD , Jan. 20, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5644606. The U.S. is not 
accepting blood donations from individuals who are from Britain or visited Britain during the height of 
the BSE fright. See id. Clearly, the U.S. sees the concern over the BSE epidemic as serious and is now 
trying to protect its own people. See id. See also  Alicia Ault, FDA Urged to Defer Donations by UK 
Residents, LANCET, Jan. 2, 1999, available in  1999 WL 9762247. 
 171. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: 
Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 231, 234 (1997). “Most governments 
want to be able to ban the importation of goods embodying standards that do not meet their chosen 
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will adopt uniform requirements and agree to a set of standards for products, 
determining same requirements will not be simple.172 The underlying reasons 
for the current trade problem173 will not disappear merely because 
compromise is sought.174 In forming the agreement the U.S. and the EU will 
undoubtedly strive to maintain individualized regulation programs.175 An 
agreement, however, can bring about the sharing of scientific research and 
raising of standards by both the U.S. and the EU in such a way as to impose a 
new, higher duty of care upon manufacturers. Instead of a race to the bottom, 
perhaps the drafters of the agreement can strive for a race to the top.176 
 
 
level of [health, safety and] environmental protection; at the same time many governments do not want 
these standards used as a barrier to free trade, especially not as a disguised means of protectionism.” 
Id.  
 172. See Discussion following the remarks of Mr. Wainwright at the Proceedings of the Canada-
United States Law Institute Conference: The Impact of Technological Change in the Canada/U.S. 
Context, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 89 (1999). Mr. Wainwright noted that a balance needs to be struck between 
the interests of government and citizens in the WTO trade discussions. He further noted that the U.S. 
and EU were already negotiating “mutual recognition agreements” although such agreements primarily 
concern industrial products. See id. 
 173. Protectionism, culture, and reliance on health and safety measures, and socio-economic 
power  
 174. Note the argument against the FDA in the BST case. There is no reason for the EU to believe 
that the FDA is a reliable agency when the citizens of the U.S. question the procedures and actions of 
the agency. The FDA presented guidelines in October 1998 for the use of gelatins and the risk of BSE. 
This is after an advisory committee in April 1998 recommended the gelatins were no longer safe. 
 175. A practical problem not addressed in the proposed agreement is the actions of the individual 
countries of the EU. If the countries individually seek to refrain from allowing a product into their 
country, there is no provision of the EU treaty that requires them to follow the agreements with other 
countries (unless it is in the treaty provisions – making each member state obligated by the treaty of 
the EU). Thus, the countries could individually ban products from the U.S. although the EU could not. 
Thus it is not beneficial for the U.S. to subject itself to an agreement to allow all EU products into the 
U.S. that meet the requirements of the agreement. A solution to this problem would be to include 
language in the agreement that allows the U.S. to treat countries with legislation contrary to the 
Agreement differently than countries with deference to the EU. This would encourage member states 
of the EU to comply with the requirements of the Agreement in order to have their products considered 
in the U.S. under the agreement. Similarly, the language would provide for states in the U.S. that seek 
to keep out EU products. Under the Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the 
states would be compelled to comply with the agreement. 
 176. A race to the top would require an expectation of higher standards. Agreeing to “lower 
standards, minimally and temporarily would potentially raise expectations of the U.S. and the EU, the 
manufacturers would then bear the burden of proving the product to be of a quality such that the health 
and safety of consumers is not compromised. But consider that one of the fundamental differences 
between the U.S. and the EU is their differing approaches to business. The EU’s highly regulated, 
socialist practices differs widely from the idea of the “American Dream.” An initial consideration of 
this idea may create an uproar with the manufacturers and businesses in the U.S. who consider the 
FDA to be too regulatory already. On the other hand, the FDA and the U.S. government do use other 
methods to prevent European Products from entering the U.S. market. The manufacturers would need 
to accept the compromise that in the long run will most benefit them by having high quality products 
in the European market. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. contends that its country is BSE free and should not be subject 
to the restricting bovine trade regulations of the European Council. The U.S. 
contends further that actions of the European Council, i.e., the BST 
restrictions, amount to protectionism, and are in violation of WTO 
expectations. The EU, on the other hand, appears to be willing to delay the 
enforcement of legislation such as the cosmetics ban to further research its 
position and to avoid a trade disagreement.177 This postponement is not a 
solution, however, because there is no assurance that the EU will not 
eventually enforce this legislation and restrict the entry of certain cosmetic 
products into the member states. This possibility seems greater in light of the 
EU’s extended time for compliance with the WTO Appellate decision 
against it. 
The result of the legislation and subsequent postponement has been to 
produce caution in present trade dealings. The governments of the EU and 
the U.S. need to work together and come to an agreement in order to allow 
private industries to continue to develop trade relationships with one another. 
The proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade Agreement presents an opportunity to 
create a solution to this problem. The minimum result of the agreement 
should be an understanding that will address future problems, especially 
those involving health and safety issues, in this era of developing biological 
engineering industries. The fast pace of scientific discovery often leaves 
more questions than answers in its wake. As for the future of the cosmetic 
legislation, it is incumbent upon the U.S. and EU to break the present cycle 
of trade disputes by seeking compromise instead of retaliatory measures. 
Victoria H. Zerjav 
 
 
 177.  In sharp contrast to its delay in enforcement of the cosmetics ban, the EU has actively 
enforced its legislation banning contaminated beef. See Suzanne Daley, Mad Cow Disease Panicking 
Europe as Incidents Rise, N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A1 (explaining that the 2000 outbreak of BSE 
has led to bans on beef in 15 EU countries, with the latest bans targeting contaminated beef from 
France and Germany). 
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